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DODD–FRANK’S PROTECTIONS FOR SENIOR CITIZENS: AN 
IMPORTANT, YET INSUFFICIENT STEP 
Julie Goldsmith Reiser* & Michael B. Eisenkraft** 
President Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Protection Act1 (Dodd–Frank or the Act) into law on July 21, 2010.  
Dodd–Frank, the full title of which is, “An Act [t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect 
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes,” is 848 
pages long and filled with numerous important regulations for 
America’s financial system—many of which have attracted widespread 
notice and debate in popular media.  For instance, according to 
Wikipedia: 
In addition to the headline regulatory changes covering capital investment 
by banks and insurance companies, the Act introduces new regulation of 
hedge funds and private equity funds, alters the definition of accredited 
investors, requires reporting by all public companies on CEO to median 
employee pay ratios and other compensation data, enforces equitable 
access to credit for consumers, and provides incentives to promote 
banking among low- and medium-income residents.2 
This Article is about none of these important and prominent 
provisions of Dodd–Frank.  Instead, it is about one of the “other 
purposes,” referenced in the full title of Dodd–Frank—a few provisions 
buried amongst Dodd–Frank’s 848 pages that touch ever so lightly on an 
issue that seems at first glance both noncontroversial and modest in 
comparison to the more publicized problems tackled by Dodd–Frank, 
but in fact represents one of the most important and potentially thorny 
issues facing the American economy: how to protect the financial assets 
 
 * Julie Goldsmith Reiser is a partner in the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection practice group 
in the Washington, D.C. office of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.  Ms. Reiser focuses much of her 
practice on enforcement of the federal securities laws on behalf of sophisticated domestic and 
international institutional investors. 
 ** Michael Eisenkraft is a partner in the Securities Fraud/Investor Protection and Small 
Business practice groups in the New York office of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.  Mr. 
Eisenkraft focuses much of his practice on the representation of plaintiffs in securities class actions and 
other complex commercial litigation. 
 1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. 
 2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, WIKIPEDIA (June 22, 2012,  
11:19 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_ 
Consumer_Protection_Act&oldid=498816065 (accessed from Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act page by clicking “View history” tab near search bar then clicking on the June 22, 2012, 11:19 
version). 
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of senior citizens from the potentially deleterious effects of age and 
those who would take advantage of their condition. 
Specifically, this Article describes the shape and scope of the problem 
that inspired the elder protection portions of the legislation, details what 
Dodd–Frank did to protect the elderly from financial peril, analyzes the 
weaknesses of the steps Congress has taken, examines the potential 
pitfalls to be aware of when developing protections for seniors, and 
advocates for three additional steps that should be taken to adequately 
combat this problem. 
Specifically, in order to effectively tackle the problem of elderly 
financial abuse, a problem of large and rapidly increasing scope, the 
following policies should be put into place: (1) bank officials, health 
professionals, brokers, and insurance agents should all become 
mandatory reporters of elder financial abuse—a step that would bring 
thousands of trained eyes to bear on a problem which has grown large 
and monstrous in the shadows; (2) brokers and insurance agents should 
owe a fiduciary duty to their customers, making them responsible for 
recommending products that will benefit their customers, not just their 
employers; and (3) there should be a license required to sell financial 
products to senior citizens which would require a short course on the 
special needs of the elderly and a criminal background check. 
I. FINANCIAL FRAUD AND THE ABUSE OF SENIORS: THE ORIGINS OF 
DODD–FRANK’S SENIOR-SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS 
Most of the senior-specific provisions of Dodd–Frank did not 
originate with Senator Dodd, Congressman Frank, or the finance 
committees.3  Instead, these provisions originated in the Senior 
Investment Protection Act of 2008,4 a bill proposed by Senator Herb 
Kohl (D-WI) in his role as Chairman of the U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging.5  This bill stemmed from a hearing held in 
September 2007 by the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging.6  
Eventually Senator Kohl, who was also a member of the Senate Finance 
Committee, got some of the provisions of the Senior Investment 
Protection Act enacted into law as part of Dodd–Frank.  While it is 
difficult or even impossible to know what exactly motivated Senator 
Kohl, the Senate, or the House to include these specific provisions in 
 
 3. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, Commc’ns Dir., Senate Special Comm. on Aging 
(Apr. 20, 2012). 
 4. Senior Investment Protection Act of 2008, S. 2794 (2008). 
 5. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
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Dodd–Frank or even to advocate for their passage,7 the testimony given 
at the September 2007 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Aging provides a very good clue.  Published discussions and analyses of 
the problem offer further clues. 
A. The Size of the Problem 
The most striking facts presented during the September Hearings 
concern the scope of the financial assets at stake.  The size of the senior 
population and the assets seniors do or will control is nothing short of 
astounding.  In 2006, according to census data, there were more than 
thirty-seven million Americans age sixty-five and older, accounting for 
12% of the total population.8  There were five million people age eighty-
five and older, nearly two million in their nineties, and more than 73,000 
Americans age 100 or older.9  While seniors make up a very substantial 
minority of this country, seniors control a majority of this country’s 
financial assets.  As of 2007, seniors owned 80% of all the money in 
U.S. savings and loan institutions, and 77% of all financial assets in 
America.10  As of 2007, it was estimated that Americans sixty-five or 
older held $15 trillion of assets.11  These numbers are continuing to 
grow as the baby boom generation ages.  Americans aged fifty-five to 
sixty-four have the highest income and net worth of any age group, and 
households led by people over forty own more than 91% of the nation’s 
wealth.12 
The size of the senior population and its wealth has an enormous 
effect on public policy decisions designed to help seniors.  It means that 
any restriction on or privilege accorded to seniors will affect a majority 
of the country’s financial assets.  This has enormous implications.  For 
instance, if Congress decided that a financial product was inappropriate 
for seniors and prohibited its sale to those sixty-five or older, that 
financial product would find its potential market shrunk by more than 
half, because seniors control a majority of financial assets. 
Despite their strength in numbers, on an individual basis, seniors are 
 
 7. Cf. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of 
legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute . . . .”). 
 8. Protecting Senior Citizens from Investment Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on 
Aging, 110th Cong. 21 (2007) [hereinafter Protecting Senior Citizens] (statement of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Senior Fraud and the Sale of Annuities: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th 
Cong. 33 (2007) [hereinafter Senior Fraud] (statement of Lori Swanson, Attorney Gen., State of 
Minnesota). 
 11. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 21. 
 12. Id. 
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extremely vulnerable.  According to a 2008 medical study, one third of 
people over the age of seventy-one suffer from cognitive impairment—
meaning that approximately 8.8 million seniors have mild cognitive 
impairment, dementia, or changes in executive cognitive functions.13  
Cognitive impairment, in turn, makes people “more likely to make 
financial errors and more willing to gamble with their money.”14  
Chairman Cox of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
testified that one reason that seniors are victimized is the “declining 
mental faculties of senior investors which negatively impacts their 
personal financial management.”15  This victimization also causes 
disproportionate harm to seniors because “when seniors lose their life’s 
savings, they lack the time to rebuild a nest egg.”16  Seniors themselves 
are well aware of their vulnerability.  Though a statistic does not 
generally trigger an emotional response, it is hard not to find 
heartbreaking the fact that surveys conducted by the American 
Association for Retired Persons (AARP) found that “[t]hree out of five 
older Americans fear death less than they fear running out of money 
before they die . . . .”17 
Unfortunately, this fear is well-founded, as the scope of the 
victimization of seniors is striking.  According to a 2011 report by 
MetLife Inc., the annual loss by victims of elder abuse is $2.9 billion, up 
$300 million in just four years.18  This large loss number corresponds to 
a large number of victims.  According to estimates, at least one in five 
Americans over the age of sixty-five has been a victim of financial 
fraud.19  Even more dramatically, the Elder Financial Abuse Task Team 
Report to the California Commission on Aging found that over 70% of 
 
 13. See Elizabeth Olson, When Abuse of Older Patients Is Financial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, 
at F11 (quoting Dr. Robert E. Roush, Director of the Texas Consortium Geriatric Education Center at 
the Baylor College of Medicine); see also Brenda L. Plassman et al., Prevalence of Cognitive 
Impairment Without Dementia in the United States, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED, 6, 427–34 (2008) 
(cited in ROBERT E. ROUSH & AANAND NAIK, PREVENTING ELDER INVESTMENT FRAUD: ASSESSING 
FOR VULNERABILITY TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, available at http://www.americangeriatrics.org/ 
files/documents/annual_meeting/2012/handouts/thursday/R0730-5305_Robert_E._Roush.pdf). 
 14. Olson, supra note 13. 
 15. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 22 (“A recent study by a researcher from the 
Federal Reserve and a professor at the University of Texas is only the most recent of many to suggest 
that one reason is the declining mental faculties of senior investors, which negatively impacts their 
personal financial management.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Olson, supra note 13. 
 18. See David Crary, Scams Targeting the Elderly on the Rise, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 4, 
2012, www. charlotteobserver.com/2012/03/04/3066742/scams-targeting-the-elderly-on.html. 
 19. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by Commisioner: Why 
seniors Are More Vulnerable Now As Targets for Financial Abuse, (Mar. 15, 2012) (delivered by 
Smeeta Ramarathnam, Comm’r Aguilar’s Chief of Staff). 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/5
2012] PROTECTIONS FOR SENIOR CITIZENS 525 
people over the age of fifty had been fraudulently solicited.20 
This reality was discussed extensively at the 2007 hearing.  
According to the testimony of Joseph P. Borg, Director of the Alabama 
Securities Commission and President of the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA),21 preliminary results from a 2007 
study of NASAA’s members revealed that 44% of investor complaints 
came from seniors.22  This significantly understates the scope of senior 
financial victimization because senior complaints are generally 
underreported due to issues of shame or ignorance.23  In fact, it is 
estimated that only one in twenty-five cases of elder financial abuse is 
reported.24  Furthermore, these are not bogus complaints.  Since 2004, 
more than 75% of the annuity complaints reported by state regulators to 
NAIC have been resolved in favor of the consumer.25  Even without 
taking into account underreporting, however, it is clear that seniors are 
disproportionately victimized by financial fraud, and that there is a 
poisonous combination of mentally vulnerable seniors with vast 
financial resources being preyed upon by unscrupulous people. 
B. The Shape of the Problem: How Seniors Are Victimized 
Financial scams vary widely, but there are some patterns and common 
practices.  One common practice is the sale of inappropriate financial 
products, especially certain types of annuities.  According to the 
testimony of Director Joseph Borg, a massive “thirty-four percent of all 
cases of senior exploitation involved variable or equity index 
annuities.”26  According to the Testimony of Minnesota Attorney 
General Lori Swanson, some insurance companies offer large 
commissions and other incentives especially to salesmen who sell long-
 
 20. RICHARD RYDER & CHERI JASINSKI, ELDER FINANCIAL ABUSE TASK TEAM REPORT TO THE 
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON AGING (2005), available at 
http://www.ccoa.ca.gov/res/docs/pubs/Elder_Financial_Abuse.pdf. 
 21. The oldest international organization devoted to investor protection, the North American 
Securities Administrators Association, Inc., was founded in 1919.  Its membership consists of the 
securities administrators in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. See About Us, NASAA, www.nasaa.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
 22. See Advising seniors About Their Money: Who Is Qualified—and Who Is Not?: Hearing 
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 56 (2007) [hereinafter Borg, Advising Seniors] 
(statement of Joseph P. Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission and President, North American 
Securities Administrators Association).  See Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 39. 
 23. See Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 39. 
 24. Leslie Callaway & Jerry Becker, Stopping the Financial Abuse of seniors, ABA BANK 
COMPLIANCE, July–Aug. 2011, at 12. 
 25. Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 75 (2007) (statement of Sandy 
Praeger, Kansas Insurance Commissioner and National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
President–Elect). 
 26. Borg, Advising Seniors, supra note 22, at 56 (emphasis added). 
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term deferred annuities (a product generally not appropriate for seniors), 
to senior citizens.27  Attorney General Swanson also described in detail 
the workings of the so-called “Million Dollar Academy” at “Annuity 
University,” which trains agents how to be a “success in the senior 
market.”  According to Swanson, an investigative journalist for the Wall 
Street Journal attended “Annuity University” at which the following 
advice was given to insurance agents about how to “push annuities on 
senior citizens”: 
Treat them like they’re blind twelve-year-olds. 
There’s the technical answer, and there’s the senior answer.  Tell them 
it’s like a CD—it’s safe, it’s guaranteed. 
You’re there to solve their problems, but you have to create those 
problems first.  No problem, no sale.  So at the seminars, you’re creating 
problems, and you tease them with the solutions . . . . 
They thrive on fear, anger and greed.  Show them their finances are all 
screwed up so they think, ‘Oh, no, I’ve done it all wrong.’  This will 
make you money. 
Tell them you can protect their life savings from nursing home and 
Medicaid seizure of assets.  They don’t know what it is, but it sounds 
scary.  It’s about putting a pitchfork in their chest.28 
In addition to certain types of financial products, there are certain 
types of scams that are used over and over again.  According to a study 
by the NASD Investor Foundation, fraudsters use “social influence 
tactics to get their victims to sign on.”29  Among the most common 
“social influence tactics” are dangling the prospect of wealth or prizes to 
tempt seniors; convincing seniors that peers, neighbors, and other 
respected people in the community are all making this particular 
investment; describing the investment as a rare opportunity to force the 
senior to act quickly; and creating reciprocity, e.g., providing the senior 
a small favor, like a free lunch, to induce the senior to feel obligated to 
return the favor by buying the investment.  More recently, some of the 
most “popular” scams used to target seniors are fraudsters claiming to 
be calling from the government (often the Social Security 
Administration or the IRS), the Grandparent Scam (impostors posing as 
a grandchild in need of cash to cope with an emergency), the 
homecoming fraud (con artists pose as soldiers serving in Afghanistan 
needing money for their homecoming), the ever-popular lottery scam 
(telling seniors they won the lottery or another prize, but need to pay 
 
 27. Senior Fraud, supra note 10, at 34. 
 28. Id. at 35–36. 
 29. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 23. 
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some money to receive it), and the amusingly titled, but unfortunately 
no less painful Toilet Paper Scam, where fraudsters persuade seniors to 
pay exorbitant sums of money for goods and services (e.g., special toilet 
paper to comply with new regulations and not destroy their septic 
tanks).30 
There are also patterns to victimization.  In August of 2009, the U.S. 
Administration on Aging described to Congress four common scenarios 
by which a senior can become a victim: (1) seniors are a “financial 
prisoner,” as they are physically and perhaps psychologically dependent 
on their caregiver; (2) seniors are losing their ability to handle their 
financial affairs due to physical or cognitive impairment and a “new best 
friend” gradually assumes responsibility for handling the senior’s affairs 
and abuses that trust; (3) a widow or widower does not know how to 
handle the financial affairs which his or her deceased spouse took care 
of, and gets taken advantage of by someone offering assistance; and (4) 
seniors, perhaps out of fear or paranoia, refuse help or financial advice 
from reliable, responsible relatives or other individuals and instead turn 
to strangers.31 
In an effort to illustrate the problem, a number of witnesses at the 
2007 hearing shared heart-wrenching stories of the victimization of 
specific seniors.  Chairman Cox, of the SEC, told the Committee about 
his parents.  Despite the fact that his mother was suffering from throat 
cancer and could barely speak, and his father was in the throes of 
Alzheimer’s disease, they received repeated unsolicited pitches (both 
over the phone and in person) for an endless amount of annuity schemes 
and mortgage offers.  The products pushed by these brokers were 
affirmatively harmful to people in circumstances like Chairman Cox’s 
parents.  The annuity products locked away savings with huge penalties 
for withdrawal and the mortgages were equally bad if not worse.  
Chairman Cox cited the example of one salesman who called over a 
dozen times pushing his mother to refinance her safe, low-rate thirty-
year mortgage with a short-term loan that had a balloon and a teaser 
rate—a deal that would have cost his parents their home when it came 
due.  Even though Chairman Cox personally warned him never to call 
her again, he continued.32  
Nicholas A. Nicolette, President of the Financial Planning 
 
 30. David Crary, Scams Targeting Older Americans Enriching Con Artists and Law 
Enforcement Find the Crimes Among the Toughest to Prosecute, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 4, 2012, 11:32 
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46574273/ns/business-personal_finance/t/scams-targeting-older-
americans-enriching-con-artists/#.T-hri3km-YI. 
 31. See Callaway, supra note 24, at 12–13 (citing U.S. ADMIN. ON AGING, FINANCIAL 
EXPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2009)). 
 32. Protecting Senior Citizens, supra note 8, at 22. 
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Association, shared the story of a 79-year-old Pennsylvania man who 
was victimized by an unscrupulous annuity salesman.33  The 79-year-old 
man was persuaded by the agent to sign a power of attorney, giving the 
agent access to the victim’s CDs, cash and mutual funds.  The salesman 
put all of these assets in “unsuitable annuities.”  After learning that he 
had been wiped out, the man went into a deep depression and died.  The 
insurance company tried to remedy the wrong committed by the 
salesman by offering the man his money back.  The offer was received 
by the man’s family via a letter, which arrived on the day of the funeral, 
and his family buried him with the letter in his pocket.  Mr. Nicolette 
concluded by revealing that the salesman in question was still in 
business, despite being sanctioned several times by state officials.34 
C. The Stubbornness of the Problem: Why We Haven’t Stopped Senior 
Financial Abuse 
Senior financial abuse is not going away; in fact, it is rapidly growing 
into a bigger and bigger problem.  As mentioned above, according to a 
2011 report, the annual loss by victims of elder abuse is at $2.9 billion, 
up dramatically from $2.6 billion in 2008.35  This is despite the fact that 
the problematic behavior at issue (the scams or sales of inappropriate 
financial products) is generally criminalized, or at least universally 
strongly disapproved of, and there is heightened awareness of the 
problem.  So why is financial abuse of seniors going up instead of 
down? 
There are a number of reasons for this.  First, from a law enforcement 
perspective, seniors are nightmare victims for three reasons: (1) as 
discussed above, they are reluctant to come forward and report the 
crime, which makes awareness of the crime, much less catching 
criminals, extraordinarily difficult; (2) even if a crime is reported, a 
senior may not have all of his or her mental facilities, which may make 
her a very problematic witness—especially in a he-said-she-said case 
(“Mr. Smith told me he wanted to buy this structured annuity,” “Mr. 
Smith gave me the money,” etc.); and (3) seniors, by definition, are 
elderly, and cases take a long time to be resolved—there is a real danger 
that a senior may not be around or capable of testifying at a trial even if 
she was mentally and physically healthy when victimized.  All three of 
these reasons make it very difficult for traditional law enforcement 
 
 33. Advising seniors About Their Money: Who’s Qualified—and Who’s Not?: Hearing Before 
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 66 (2007) (statement of Nicholas A. Nicolette, President of 
the Financial Planning Association). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Crary, supra note 30. 
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efforts to effectively target senior fraud. 
Second, regulation of insurance companies and most fraud crimes 
occurs at the state level.  This is problematic because much of the fraud 
that goes on is often by out-of-state or even international actors.  
Everyone is familiar with the internet fraudsters from Nigeria and the 
computer hackers of the former Soviet Union, but there are other 
hotbeds of senior fraud too.  For instance, so many recent lottery scam 
calls have come from Jamaica that its 876 area code is now cited as a 
warning sign by experts.36  The 2007 hearing included testimony that it 
was difficult for state regulators to go after fraudsters like sponsors of 
deceptive marketing materials because many of those entities are located 
outside the investigating state and questioned the jurisdiction of the state 
agency.37 
Moreover, the states simply do not have the resources—whether 
measured in finances, knowledge, or manpower—to effectively deal 
with this enormous and rapidly growing problem.  A study by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that state Adult Protective 
Services programs’ “challenges” included growth in caseloads and an 
increase in the complexity of those cases.38  These programs deal with 
these increasing challenges with decreasing resources.  The GAO found 
that twenty-five of the thirty-eight states surveyed had total Adult 
Protective Services funding remain static or decrease over the past five 
years and “program officials . . . ranked insufficient funding for program 
operations as the most significant challenge they faced.”39 
Third, many key actors do not know how to deal with seniors or their 
special needs.  Mr. Edwin J. Pittock, President of the Society of 
Certified Senior Advisors, testified that “[t]here is only a one in six 
chance that an American university offers one or more courses in 
gerontology” and “[f]ew companies who have seniors as customers 
require any education for their employees.”40  Furthermore, according to 
Mr. Pittock, he is:  
unaware of any state or federal requirement that anyone working with 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 50 (2007) (statement of William 
Francis Galvin, Secretaryy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (“Our investigation into many of 
the sponsors of the marketing materials described above proved quite difficult, because many of those 
sponsors are located outside of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and were not forthcoming in their 
responses to our requests for information.  Moreover, a number of them questioned our jurisdiction over 
entities not based in Massachusetts.”). 
 38. Aguilar, supra note 19. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Educating Professionals to Serve seniors Better: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on 
Aging, 110th Cong. 104 (2007) (statement of Edwin J. Pittock, President, Society of Certified senior 
Advisors). 
9
Reiser and Eisenkraft: Dodd-Frank's Protections for Senior Citizens: An Important, Yet I
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
530 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
seniors gain even a minimal amount of knowledge (unless it is within 
their own discipline) about how seniors are different and the optimal 
ways to work with them, such as determining whether a client has 
dementia and being able to recognize factors that can lead to abuse.41 
II. DODD–FRANK: A FIRST STEP TOWARD PROTECTING SENIORS’ 
FINANCIAL SECURITY 
Many of the problems and solutions discussed at the 2007 Hearing 
were reflected in those provisions of Dodd–Frank that safeguard the 
elderly.  Section 989A of Dodd–Frank defines a “senior citizen” or 
“senior” as anyone 62 years or older.42  This age was chosen because it 
corresponds to the lowest age at which an individual can begin to collect 
Social Security.43  Dodd–Frank mentions “senior,” in reference to those 
62 years of age or older, in a scant four provisions scattered amongst its 
848 pages. 
A. Section 911 of Dodd–Frank: The Investor Advisory Committee 
Section 911 of the Act modifies the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
in order to create an “investor advisory committee,” which must include 
a “representative of the interests of senior citizens.”  The Act requires 
that the other members of the “investor advisory committee” consist of 
the Investor Advocate,44 a representative of state securities 
commissions, and between ten and twenty individuals who: 
(i) represent the interests of individual equity and debt investors, 
including investors in mutual funds; (ii) represent the interests of 
institutional investors, including the interests of pension funds and 
registered investment companies; (iii) are knowledgeable about 
 
 41. Id. at 108. 
 42. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, § 989A(7) (2010). 
 43. Telephone Interview with Ken Willis, supra note 3.  Today, at the age of sixty-two, a person 
can collect a reduced social security benefit.  This is actually a relatively new option, introduced in 1956 
for women and for men in 1961.  See Lenore A. Epstein, Early Retirement and Work–Life Experience, 
BULLETIN, Mar. 1966, available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v29n3/v29n3p3.pdf.  Originally, 
social security was only available at age sixty-five, an age selected based on the fact that prevailing 
retirement ages for the pension system available at the time were either sixty-five or seventy.  Roughly 
half the state pension systems used sixty-five, as did the federal Railroad Retirement System, passed by 
Congress earlier in 1934.  Frequently Asked Questions: The Origins of the Retirement Age in Social 
Security, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
 44. The Investor Advocate, a position created by Section 915 of the Act, reports directly to the 
Chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission and his assignment is to protect the interests of 
investors. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, § 915 (2010). 
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investment issues and decisions; and (iv) have reputations of integrity.45 
The purpose of the “investment advisory committee” is to advise and 
consult with the Commission on: (1) regulatory priorities of the 
Commission; (2) issues relating to the regulation of securities products, 
trading strategies, and fee structures, and the effectiveness of disclosure; 
(3) initiatives to protect investor interest; and (4) initiatives to promote 
investor confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.46  
The Commission must, each time the “investment advisory committee” 
submits a finding or recommendation, promptly issue a public statement 
assessing it and disclosing what action, if any, the Commission will take 
in response.47 
The existence of a single, guaranteed seat on the “investor advisory 
committee” reveals a great deal about the attitude of Congress, as 
expressed in Dodd–Frank, about senior citizen finances.  First, the 
presence of a dedicated seat to represent senior interests shows that 
Congress believes that senior citizens have special interests and needs 
that are distinct from those of the interests of individual debt and equity 
investors.48  Second, the fact that only a single seat is reserved for senior 
 
 45. Id.  Interestingly, while the statute specifically provides for the appointment of the between 
ten and twenty members of the “investment advisory committee” who represent the investing public by 
the Commission and there are specific statutory provisions governing the selection of the Investor 
Advocate there is no specific provision for appointing the representative of the interests of senior 
citizens or the representative of State securities commissions.  In practice, however, all members of the 
investment advisory committee were nominated by all five sitting SEC Commissioners.  See id. 
§ 911(b)(1)(D), § 915; see also Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of 
New Investor Advisory Comm. (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-
58.htm. 
 46. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, § 911(a)(2)(A) (2010). 
 47. Id. § 911(g). 
 48. The current members of the investment advisory committee are: Darcy Bradbury, Managing 
Director and Director of External Affairs, D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P.; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Law Professor, 
University of Denver; Joseph Dear, Chief Investment Officer, California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System; Eugene Duffy, Partner and Principal, Paradigm Asset Management Co. LLC; Roger Ganser, 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of BetterInvesting; James Glassman, Executive Director, George W. 
Bush Institute; Craig Goettsch, Director of Investor Education and Consumer Outreach, Iowa Insurance 
Division; Joseph Grundfest, William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; 
Mellody Hobson, President and Director of Ariel Investments, LLC; Stephen Holmes, General Partner 
and Chief Operating Officer, InterWest Partners; Adam Kanzer, Managing Director and General 
Counsel of Domini Social Investments and Chief Legal Officer of the Domini Funds; Roy Katzovicz, 
Partner, Investment Team Member and Chief Legal Officer, Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.; 
Barbara Roper, Director of Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America; Kurt Schacht, 
Managing Director, CFA Institute; Alan Schnitzer, Vice Chairman and Chief Legal Officer, The 
Travelers Companies, Inc.; Jean Setzfand, Director of Financial Security for the AARP; Anne Sheehan, 
Director of Corporate Governance, California State Teachers’ Retirement System; Damon Silvers, 
Associate General Counsel for the AFL-CIO; Mark Tresnowski, Managing Director and General 
Counsel, Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC; Steven Wallman, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, 
Foliofn, Inc.; Ann Yerger, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors.  See Press Release, 
Sec. and Exch. Comm., supra note 45.  Though the SEC press release did not specifically identify which 
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interests, while between ten and twenty are for institutional and 
individual investors, indicates that Congress believes senior interests are 
either less important than, or generally not in conflict with, the interests 
of individual and institutional investors.49 
B. The Model Rules: Sections 989A & 989J of Dodd–Frank 
Section 989A of the Act, entitled senior Investor Protections, is one 
of the most detailed provisions of Dodd–Frank addressing fraudulent 
schemes that target seniors.  Subsection 989A(b) establishes a grant 
program under which Grants may be made to:  
(1) hire staff to identify, investigate, and prosecute cases involving 
misleading or fraudulent marketing; (2) fund law enforcement efforts to 
identify salespersons and advisers who target seniors through the use of 
misleading designations; (3) increase funding for the successful 
prosecution of salespersons and advisers who target seniors with the use 
of misleading designations; (4) provide educational materials and training 
to regulators on the appropriateness of the use of designations by 
salespersons and advisers in connection with the sale and marketing of 
financial products; (5) provide educational materials and training to 
seniors to increase awareness and understanding of misleading or 
fraudulent marketing; (6) develop comprehensive plans to combat 
misleading or fraudulent marketing of financial products to seniors; and 
(7) enhance provisions of State law to provide protection for seniors 
against misleading or fraudulent marketing.50 
This aspect of Section 989A is revelatory because of the financial 
danger to seniors it identifies and targets—misleading or fraudulent 
marketing of financial products and the con artists and fraudsters who 
target seniors with these methods—and the proposals it puts forward in 
response.  Section 989A takes two approaches to these dangers—six out 
of the seven clauses play offense by spending money to encourage more 
effective law enforcement efforts to catch and deter fraudsters who 
target seniors.51  Section 989A(b)(5) plays defense against these 
fraudsters by permitting funds to be applied to educate seniors to 
 
member of the investment advisory council represents senior interests, it is presumably Jean Setzfand, 
Director of Financial Security for the AARP. 
 49. If there was ever a conflict between senior interests and those of individual/institutional 
investors, the single senior vote would be overwhelmed by the ten to twenty votes of those representing 
individual/institutional investors.  Congress must not have been concerned about this outcome either 
because they did not care if senior interests were outvoted or, perhaps more likely, because they 
believed that institutional/individual and senior interests would usually be compatible, and at the very 
least, rarely be in conflict. 
 50. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, § 989A(b)(1)–(7) (2010). 
 51. See id. 
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increase their awareness and understanding of misleading or fraudulent 
marketing. 
Section 989A also has a second prong for effecting change.  The 
maximum amount of these 989A grants ($500,000 for three consecutive 
fiscal years) is available only if a state has adopted rules that: (1) meet 
or exceed the minimum requirements of the NASAA model rule on the 
Use of Senior-Specific Certifications and Professional Designations (or 
any successor thereto), (2) regulate the sale of insurance of products in a 
way that conforms to the minimum requirements of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model regulation on 
the Use of Senior-Specific Certifications and Professional Designations 
in the Sale of Life Insurance and Annuities (or any successor thereto), 
and (3) regulate fiduciary or suitability requirements in the sale of 
annuities that meet or exceed the minimum requirements established by 
the Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation (SATMR) of 
NAIC (or any successor thereto).52  States are only eligible for grants of 
$100,000 if they meet the first or the second and third of these 
requirements,  and are presumably ineligible for grants if they fall below 
these minimum requirements.53 
The approach taken in this portion of Section 989A can be 
characterized in three ways.  First, with its use of the various model 
rules and regulations cited above as baselines, it is pushing 
standardization across the fifty states.  This one size fits all states 
approach indicates that Congress believes that the victimization of 
seniors by fraudsters is both a nationwide problem and one that can 
benefit from relative uniformity of laws over all states.  Second, it is a 
very gentle push towards standardization.  The federal government is 
not enacting or creating its own federal law or regulation, instead it is 
encouraging the adoption of standards that meet or exceed minimum 
requirements created by groups of state regulators.54  This is a very 
flexible and deferential approach by the federal government. 
Furthermore, the grants, at a maximum of $500,000 a year, are very 
modest.  This is not the federal government using its power of the purse 
to coerce states to do its bidding; instead this is, at most, a tiny nudge to 
go a certain direction or take action.  This either reflects the fact that the 
goal of the federal government is to encourage and standardize a 
growing consensus amongst the states, not to browbeat states in doing 
what they don’t want, or that the adoption of the model rules and 
regulations or their equivalent is not particularly important to Congress.  
The first interpretation is borne out by the facts as they currently exist, 
 
 52. Id. § 989A(e)(1). 
 53. Id. § 989A(e)(2). 
 54. Id. § 989A(e)(1). 
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because, as of February 2012, twenty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted the NAIC model regulation, and thirty states and 
the District of Columbia have enacted the NASAA model regulation.55  
Evidencing a similarly broad consensus, as of March 6, 2011, the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators endorsed NAIC’s 
SATMR.56 
Third, the substance of the model rules and regulations Dodd–Frank 
endorses reflect distinctive approaches to protecting seniors.  The 
NASAA model rule, adopted on March 20, 2008, prohibits the use of a 
senior-specific certification or designation in selling securities in a 
misleading way which includes: 
(a) use of a certification or professional designation by a person who has 
not actually earned or is otherwise ineligible to use such certification or 
designation; (b) use of a nonexistent or self-conferred certification or 
professional designation; (c) use of a certification or professional 
designation that indicates or implies a level of occupational qualifications 
obtained through education, training, or experience that the person using 
the certification or professional designation does not have; and (d) use of 
a certification or professional designation that was obtained from a 
designating or certifying organization that: (i) is primarily engaged in the 
business of instruction in sales and/or marketing; (ii) does not have 
reasonable standards or procedures for assuring the competency of its 
designees or certificants; (iii) does not have reasonable standards or 
procedures for monitoring and disciplining its designees or certificants 
for improper or unethical conduct; or (iv) does not have reasonable 
continuing education requirements for its designees or certificants in 
order to maintain the designation or certificate.57 
The model rule also creates a rebuttable presumption that a 
designating or certifying organization is not disqualified solely for 
purposes of paragraph 1(d) above when the organization has been 
accredited by: (i) The American National Standards Institute; or (ii) The 
National Commission for Certifying Agencies; or (iii) an organization 
that is on the United States Department of Education’s list entitled 
 
 55. NAIFA Supports NCOIL Resolution on senior-Specific Designations, NAIFA BLOG (Feb. 29, 
2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.naifablog.com/2012/02/index.html. 
 56. Press Release, Nat’l Conference of Ins. Regulators, NCOIL Supports NAIC Suitability 
Model, Recommends to States (Mar. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2011/03092011AnnuitySuitability.pdf.  A current, state-by-state list of 
the adoption of the Annuity Transactions Model Regulation has been compiled by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, SUSTAINABILITY IN ANNUITY 
TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION: 2012 LEGISLATION/RULEMAKING (2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_a_leg_prog_suitability_120420.pdf. 
 57. NORTH AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA MODEL RULE ON THE USE OF SENIOR-SPECIFIC 
CERTIFICATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS (2008), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/3-senior_Model_Rule_Adopted.pdf. 
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“Accrediting Agencies Recognized for Title IV Purposes” and the 
designation or credential issued therefrom does not primarily apply to 
sales and/or marketing.58 
The NAIC model for insurance regulation is almost identical in 
substance to the NASAA model rule for securities as it has essentially 
the same prohibitions and also creates a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the same three organizations.59 
In other words, NAIC (and thus Dodd–Frank), advocated for at most 
a middle-of-the-road approach with regard to senior certifications.  By 
giving preferences, but not exclusivity, to organizations approved by the 
American National Standards Institute, the National Commission for 
Certifying Agencies, and the Department of Education, NAIC created a 
safe harbor for organizations and, in some ways, perhaps a gold standard 
for knowledgeable people evaluating certifications.  At the same time, 
however, the vagueness of the standards and their refusal to create a 
centralized list of qualifying organizations (or even a central list of 
disqualified organizations) permitted the continued proliferation of 
senior-certifying organizations and did not, by any stretch of the 
imagination, eliminate confusion. 
The SATMR is similarly weak.  To its credit, this model regulation 
does impose some significant duties on insurers and insurance 
producers.  Section six of the SATMR has a suitability requirement that 
states: (1) that an insurance producer or insurer “shall have reasonable 
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the 
consumer on the basis of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or 
her investments and other insurance products and as to his or her 
financial situation and needs, including the consumer’s suitability 
information,” (2) that the customer has been “reasonably informed of 
various features of the annuity,” (3) that the “consumer would benefit 
from certain features of the annuity,” (4) that “[t]he particular annuity as 
a whole” is suitable based on the consumer’s suitability information, and 
various similar recommendations for replacement annuities.60  The 
SATMR also requires insurers to “make reasonable efforts to obtain the 
consumer’s suitability information.”61  In addition, the SATMR requires 
the memorialization of any recommendation to purchase an annuity, the 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC MODEL REGULATION ON THE USE OF SENIOR-
SPECIFIC CERTIFICATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS IN THE SALE OF LIFE INSURANCE AND 
ANNUITIES (2008), available at 
http://www.acli.com/Events/Documents/0356d2f9b6f84c3ca3140d5d5dd50b4fPagesfromWed072209C
hronologicallyChallengedLeiferD.pdf. 
 60. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY TRANSACTIONS MODEL 
REGULATION (2010), available at http://www.limra.com/pdfs/compliance/AnnuityStability.pdf. 
 61. Id. § 6(B). 
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establishment of supervision systems, and certain minimal training 
requirements.62 
All of these are good and relatively uncontroversial steps.  The flaw 
in the Annuity Rule, however, is that it only goes halfway.  There are a 
number of industry-friendly exceptions and provisions that make the 
Annuity Rule more of a strongly worded suggestion than a fierce 
command.  First, Subsection (D) of Annuity Rule six exempts any 
insurer or insurance company from the strictures of the model rules if 
the insurer did not make a “recommendation,” if the consumer provided 
inaccurate data, if the consumer refuses to provide suitability 
information, or if the consumer decides to purchase an annuity not based 
on the recommendation of the insurer.  These all sound sensible, but an 
unscrupulous agent could drive a truck through this exception by 
claiming that he was not providing a recommendation when he was, in 
fact, pushing a particular product.  In short, these exceptions run the risk 
of swallowing the rule for those who would take advantage of seniors. 
Second, the penalties for not obeying the Annuity Rule are vague and 
forgiving.  If a violation occurs,  
the commissioner may order: (1) An insurer to take reasonably 
appropriate corrective action for any consumer harmed by the insurer’s, 
or by its insurance producer’s, violation of this regulation; (2) A general 
agency, independent agency or the insurance producer to take reasonably 
appropriate corrective action for any consumer harmed by the insurance 
producer’s violation of this regulation; and (3) Appropriate penalties and 
sanctions.63 
Moreover, there is a mercy exception to even these discretionary 
penalties.  According to the Annuity Rule, any penalty “may be reduced 
or eliminated . . . if corrective action for the consumer was taken 
promptly after a violation was discovered or the violation was not part 
of a pattern or practice.”64  Moreover, the Annuity Rule explicitly 
eliminates the possibility of private actions to enforce the law, stating 
baldly that “[n]othing herein shall be construed to create or imply a 
private cause of action for a violation of this regulation.”65 
In addition to encouraging the adoption of the model rules discussed 
above via grants, Dodd–Frank also utilizes other carrots for state 
adoption.  Section 989J of the Act encourages the use of the model rules 
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by giving 
substantial advantages to insurance companies who issue policies 
 
 62. See id. §§ 6–7. 
 63. Id. § 8 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 1(B). 
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subject to the laws of states who have adopted the NAIC model 
regulations.66 
Specifically, 989J mandates that the SEC “treat as exempt securities 
described under section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933,” and any 
insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity 
contract so long as it has certain characteristics and is issued on or after 
June 26, 2013 in a state or issued by an insurance domiciled in a state 
that: (1) adopts rules which substantially meet or exceed the minimum 
requirements established by the suitability in Annuity Transactions 
model regulation adopted by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners in March 2010; and (2) adopts rules that substantially 
meet or exceed the minimum requirements of any successor 
modifications to the model regulations or is issued by an insurance 
company that implements practices on a nationwide basis that meet or 
exceed the minimum requirements established by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners Suitability in Annuity 
Transactions Model Regulation (Model 275), and any successor thereto, 
and is therefore subject to examination by the State of domicile of the 
insurance company, or by any other state where the insurance company 
conducts sales of such products, for the purpose of monitoring 
compliance under this section.67 
This is a different, and far more muscular, approach to encourage the 
adoption of NAIC model rules than that taken by 989A.  By giving 
insurance companies who issue policies under the laws of states who 
adopt NAIC model rules a competitive advantage by exempting them 
from liability under the Securities Act of 1933, 989J of Dodd–Frank 
may give those states a substantial boost in attracting insurance 
companies.  Conversely, it penalizes the states who do not adopt the 
NAIC model rules.  The 1933 Act exemption, moreover, in providing a 
reward to insurance companies who issue policies in states compliant 
with the NAIC model rules, acts in concert with 989A by eliminating, or 
at least reducing, the possibility that states who adopt the NAIC model 
rules will lose insurance business because of it. 
Interestingly, 989J also gives a great deal of power, sight unseen, to 
the future acts of NAIC by making the adoption of future rules 
promulgated by NAIC a requirement to keeping the 1933 Act 
exemption—without any caveats or restrictions on what those future 
rules might say.68  This is an extraordinary delegation of federal 
authority to a collection of state agencies as it gives them the power to 
 
 66. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, § 989J (2010). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. § 989J(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
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exempt a large swathe of financial products from a core federal statute. 
C. Section 1013(g) of Dodd Frank: The Office of Financial Protection 
for Older Americans 
Section 1013(g) provides for the establishment of the Office of 
Financial Protection for Older Americans (Office for Older Americans), 
the functions of which shall include activities designed to facilitate the 
financial literacy of individuals who have attained the age of 62 years or 
more . . . on protection from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices and 
on current and future financial choices, including through the 
dissemination of materials to seniors on such topics.69 
The Office for Older Americans is designed to focus on the financial 
education of seniors, to monitor the certification of those who provide 
financial advice to seniors, and to research best practices. 
Specifically, the educational mandate of the Office for Older 
Americans is to: 
[D]evelop goals for programs that provide seniors financial literacy and 
counseling, including programs that—(i) help seniors recognize warning 
signs of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, protect themselves from 
such practices; (ii) provide one-on-one financial counseling on issues 
including long-term savings and later-life economic security; and (iii) 
provide personal consumer credit advocacy to respond to consumer 
problems caused by unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.70 
This mandate “to develop goals for programs” is fuzzy, but it seems to 
be encouraging the creation or adoption of a set of best practices to 
educate seniors about personal finances.  Again, Dodd–Frank 
encourages coordination and standardization, but does not coerce it or 
determine the substance of what should be standardized. 
The role of the Office for Older Americans regarding certifications is 
monitoring and recommendations.  Specifically, the Office for Older 
Americans is tasked with monitoring “certifications or designations of 
financial advisors who advise seniors and alert the Commission and 
State regulators of certifications or designations that are identified as 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive” and the submission to Congress and the 
SEC 
any legislative and regulatory recommendations on the best practices for 
(i) disseminating information regarding the legitimacy of certifications of 
financial advisers who advise seniors; (ii) methods in which a senior can 
identify the financial advisor most appropriate for the senior’s needs; and 
 
 69. Id § 1013(g)(1). 
 70. Id. § 1013(g)(3). 
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(iii) methods in which a senior can verify a financial advisor’s 
credentials.71 
This sets up the Office for Older Americans as a center for expertise on 
senior advisors and certifications, but without any independent power to 
exercise that expertise. 
The research role of the Officer for Older Americans is similar.  The 
Office for Older Americans is tasked with conducting “research to 
identify best practices and effective methods, tools, technology and 
strategies to educate and counsel seniors about personal finance 
management with a focus on—(i) protecting themselves from unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices; (ii) long-term savings; and (iii) 
planning for retirement and long-term care.”72 Again, the Office for 
Older Americans is a bastion of expertise without authority to 
implement or enforce best practices. 
The Office for Older Americans is encouraged to share its expertise 
with other organizations with more clout and reach.  Section 1013 
directs the Office for Older Americans “coordinate consumer protection 
efforts of seniors with other Federal agencies and State regulators” and 
work with community organizations, non-profit organizations, and other 
entities that are involved with educating or assisting seniors.73 
III. WHY DODD–FRANK FALLS SHORT: STEPS NECESSARY TO PROTECT 
SENIORS FROM FINANCIAL ABUSE 
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank took some important steps towards 
combating the financial abuse of seniors, including most importantly, 
the recognition that seniors are at risk financially and in need of a multi-
layered response to mitigate that risk.  Ultimately, however, the steps it 
took, while in the right direction, are too timid to deal with a problem of 
this magnitude.  This portion of the Article identifies some potential 
reasons for the caution exhibited by Congress when drafting Dodd–
Frank and then advocates for three strong, additional steps that should 
be taken—namely, making health care workers and financial 
representatives mandatory reporters of senior financial abuse, mandating 
that brokers and insurance employees owe a fiduciary duty to their 
customers, and requiring a license to sell seniors financial products. 
 
 71. Id. §§ 1013(g)(3)(B)–(C). 
 72. Id. § 1013(g)(3)(D). 
 73. Id. §§ 1013(g)(3)(E)–(F). 
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A. Reasons for Caution 
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank took a cautious, deferential, and 
incremental approach to combating elder abuse.  There are a number of 
reasons for Congress’s tentativeness.  First, one of the main avenues for 
elder financial abuse, the sale of inappropriate insurance policies to 
seniors, falls squarely within a domain that has long been reserved for 
the states.  While it has long been recognized that the federal 
government can regulate insurance,74 Congress has imposed limitations 
on itself in this area.  Specifically, the McCarran–Ferguson Act,75 
exempts insurance from much federal regulation and law.  Of course, 
what Congress giveth, Congress can take away, and the historic 
reservation of this area for the States does not mean that Congress 
cannot change its mind and put federal laws or regulations in place to 
protect seniors from inappropriate insurance contracts.  This does, 
however, probably make Congress more reluctant to legislate in this 
area. 
Second, the sheer size of the senior population and its wealth makes 
the problem of senior financial abuse difficult to deal with.  As 
discussed above, seniors control a majority of the financial assets of this 
country.  Therefore, any limitation forbidding seniors from purchasing 
certain assets (e.g., certain types of annuities generally inappropriate for 
seniors) would decimate the potential market for those securities.  
Similarly, any “special” protection afforded to seniors would cover most 
of the financial assets in this country.  This magnifies the impact of any 
general protection for seniors, however small.  For instance, if the 
federal government enacted a law requiring that any financial advisor 
take certain steps before selling securities to seniors, that would slow 
down the entire financial market.  In other words, the large effect of any 
regulation or law that affected seniors and their assets means that 
Congress likely (and rightly) wanted to tread carefully and slowly. 
Third, while the definition of “senior” adopted by Dodd–Frank 
provides a bright-line demarcation exclusively based on age, the 
population of seniors is actually very diverse.  On the one hand, there 
could be a sixty-year-old with early onset dementia who does not count 
as a senior under Dodd–Frank, though he could certainly use protection.  
On the other hand, there could be luminaries like Warren Buffett (born 
in 1930, and the third wealthiest person in the world with the reputation 
as the world’s greatest investor)76 and Senator Kohl himself (born in 
 
 74. See United States v. South–Eastern. Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012). 
 76. Warren Buffett, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_Buffett (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013). 
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1935 and, with a net worth of over $250 million, one of the wealthiest 
senators)77 who are certainly not financially vulnerable or in need of 
special protection by the state at the moment. 
To make matters more complicated, both the population of seniors 
and the needs of individual seniors are by definition fluid.  As people are 
constantly getting older, the population of seniors is rapidly changing, 
expanding as people age and contracting as they pass away.  Being a 
senior is not an immutable characteristic like gender or race.  Instead, it 
is a state of being, which, if one lives long enough, will be achieved.  
This makes it less susceptible to certain kinds of protection as the 
vulnerable population itself is a moving target as a group.  This is also 
true on an individual level where one day a senior may be completely 
capable and not in need of protection, but a few years down the road he 
or she may desperately need the protection of the state.  This was 
illustrated vividly in the recent prosecution and conviction of Brooke 
Astor’s son for grand larceny for stealing money from his wealthy, but 
incapacitated mother.78  Brooke Astor, the reigning doyenne of New 
York society for many years, was one of the world’s most admired and 
influential women for decades—certainly well past the age of sixty-
two.79  At a certain point, however, this dynamic, capable, and powerful 
woman became vulnerable because of her age.  It is inherently difficult 
to design legislation that gives vulnerable seniors the protection they 
need without hamstringing seniors who need no protection at all. 
All of these factors likely explain Congress’s reluctance to take 
bolder steps to protect seniors and prevent financial abuse of the elderly. 
B. Additional Steps that Should be Taken 
Despite the difficulties described above, there are additional 
significant steps that can and should be taken, either by the states or the 
federal government, that would likely greatly assist in combating the 
scourge of senior financial abuse without having an adverse effect on 
financial instruments that are regularly sold.  Specifically, laws or 
regulations should be enacted to: (1) make certain professionals, 
specifically doctors, financial advisors, stock brokers, and insurance 
salesmen mandatory reporters for elder financial abuse; (2) establish that 
insurance salesmen, insurance companies, stock brokers, and brokerage 
houses should all have the responsibilities of a fiduciary to their 
 
 77. Herb Kohl, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herb_Kohl (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
 78. See Anthony D. Marshall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/anthony_d_marshall/index.html. 
 79. See Brooke Astor, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brooke_Astor (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013). 
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customers, and potential customers should have the usual private rights 
of action if that duty is breached; and (3) mandate that a license to sell 
financial products to seniors should be required.  As explained below, if 
enacted and implemented properly, each of these approaches could curb 
those who might otherwise be inclined to prey on seniors whose mental 
capacity and sensibilities are diminished. 
1. Mandatory Reporting of Potential Senior Abuse 
One of the biggest obstacles to effectively combating the financial 
abuse of seniors is the difficulty in detecting it.  As described above, 
95% of senior financial abuse is never reported due, in large part, to the 
shame of senior victims or their inability to seek help.80  Moreover, even 
the small fraction of senior financial abuse cases that are reported are 
brought to the attention of authorities after the crime has been 
committed—and, presumably in almost all cases, after the money is 
gone.  For the financial scams, especially those involving international 
fraudsters, this means that the money of the senior victims are 
permanently gone—dealing them a financial blow from which they may 
never recover. 
One potential solution to this severe reporting problem is to deputize 
sentries to keep an eye on seniors by making them mandatory reporters 
of potential elder financial abuse.  This is already done for child abuse, 
with teachers, doctors and various other professionals required, by state 
law, to report any potential signs of child abuse to authorities.81  The 
rationale for mandatory reporting of child abuse is that in many cases 
children are unable to understand abuse or bring it to the attention of 
authorities, both because of the limitations that their age imposes on 
their ability to independently communicate and because many times the 
abuser is a family member or family friend whom the child either cares 
about or is afraid of because of their constant proximity.  The exact 
same concerns apply to elder abuse.  Seniors suffering from cognitive 
impairment often cannot fully understand abuse (especially financial 
abuse) or bring it to the attention of authorities because of the limitations 
imposed by their mental state.  Furthermore, even where seniors 
understand that they are the victim of financial abuse, they may be 
reluctant to report it when, as is true in many cases, the person who is 
 
 80. See supra notes 23–24. 
 81. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect: 
Summary of State Laws, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.cfm (“All States, the District of 
Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands have statutes identifying persons who are required to report child maltreatment under specific 
circumstances.”). 
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victimizing them is a family member or family friend.82 
Mandatory reporting by key sentries would help alleviate this under-
reporting problem, because it would give objective, experienced people 
a duty to keep alert for, and report, elder financial abuse.  Moreover, in 
addition to discovering more elder financial abuse, thus making it more 
likely to catch the perpetrators, mandatory reporting would also, in 
many cases, result in elder financial abuse being caught much earlier.  In 
many cases this will allow the senior financial abuse to be detected 
before a great deal of irrevocable financial damage is caused. 
The most effective sentries would be those in professions who have 
the most opportunity and ability to spot senior financial abuse.  Two 
types of professionals fit this description best: (1) medical professionals 
who have the training and access to monitor seniors’ mental health (e.g., 
doctors, nurses, and home health aides); and (2) financial professionals 
who have the training and access to monitor the financial health of 
seniors (e.g., bank officials, brokers, and insurers).  Luckily, there are 
programs and laws in place that demonstrate how this mandatory 
reporting could work. 
An article published in the New York Times in March of 2011 
described a nascent program that uses doctors as a line of defense 
against senior financial fraud.  Every doctor in the program receives a 
short, four page laminated pocket guide that lists signs of potential 
financial abuse, such as overly protective caregivers, changes in an 
ability to take medications, cognitive problems, and being fearful, 
distressed, or overly suspicious.83  The packet also lists the names and 
websites for groups like the National Center on Elder Abuse and the 
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, as well as state securities 
regulators—all of which the doctors can turn to for advice or to which 
they can report their suspicions.84  This program has attracted support 
from both NASAA and the National Adult Protective Services 
Association (a group for social workers who handle abuse cases)—and 
for good reason, as it shows signs of being highly effective.85  One 
hundred and thirty doctors in Texas participated in the pilot program and 
they found that 55% of their patients “displayed signs of financial 
vulnerability and needed a follow-up by other professionals.”86  While 
this does not mean that those 55% of patients were being victimized or 
 
 82. See Crary, supra note 30 (“A federally funded study conducted for the National Institute of 
Justice in 2009 concluded that 5 percent of Americans 60 and older had been the victim of recent 
financial exploitation by a family member, while 6.5 percent were the target of a nonfamily member.”). 
 83. Olson, supra note 13. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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in danger of being victimized, it does identify as them as being 
potentially at risk for senior financial abuse—an incredibly valuable 
piece of information that could give regulators and other senior-
protectors a head start in preventing senior financial abuse even before it 
occurs. 
In the first instance, this pilot program should be expanded to all 
doctors—especially those doctors who specialize in treating seniors.  
Moreover, there is no reason why nurses and home health aides should 
not also be recruited to help.  In a slide presentation, Dr. Robert E. 
Roush and Dr. Aanand Naik explained in a number of simple steps how 
a health professional can diagnose vulnerability to senior financial 
abuse.87  Specifically, they put together a checklist of situations 
associated with high risk—namely social isolation, bereavement, 
dependence on another to provide care, being financially responsible for 
another adult, child, or spouse, alcohol or drug abuse, depression, and 
mental illness.88  They also provided examples of red flags from clinical 
observations: changes in ability to perform activities of daily living, 
including self-care, daily finances, and medication management; a sense 
of being fearful or distressed; becoming suspicious or delusional; the 
development of cognitive problems; being accompanied by an overly 
protective caregiver who dominates the patient–client; and changes in 
appearance, including poor hygiene.89  These are all signs that are easily 
observable by members of the medical community and, because 
members of the medical community are generally already mandatory 
reporters of child abuse,90 they are already familiar with this type of 
reporting responsibility.  Considering the fact that most seniors must 
regularly visit medical professionals, this makes health care providers 
ideally suited to keep watch for signs of senior financial abuse. 
Financial professionals like bank officials, brokers, and insurance 
representatives are also particularly well-suited to detect senior financial 
abuse for two reasons.  First, they generally monitor the senior’s 
financial assets.  For instance, a bank official would notice if large 
checks were suddenly being written to individuals, a broker would be 
aware if a senior suddenly started liquidating stocks or bonds and 
withdrawing money, and an insurance representative would know if a 
senior wanted to change a beneficiary on a policy or take money out of a 
 
 87. ROBERT E. ROUSH & AANAND NAIK, PREVENTING ELDER INVESTMENT FRAUD: ASSESSING 
FOR VULNERABILITY TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, available at 
http://www.americangeriatrics.org/files/documents/annual_meeting/2012/handouts/thursday/R0730-
5305_Robert_E._Roush.pdf). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 81. 
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policy’s cash value.  This means that financial professionals would be 
the first to see signs of senior financial abuse.  Second, most people are 
very reluctant to discuss their finances with anyone—financial 
professionals are one of the few exceptions to this rule, so they are most 
likely to have a sense of the senior’s financial history and to be 
comfortable speaking with a senior about any changes they have 
noticed.  Together, these factors mean that financial professionals have a 
very favorable vantage point from which to keep protective watch over 
seniors’ finances. 
As with the reporting by medical professionals described above, there 
is also a model that can be adapted and should be adopted widely.  
Specifically, California’s SB 1018, the Financial Abuse Reporting Act, 
took effect on January 1, 2007.91  California’s Financial Abuse 
Reporting Act requires employees of banks and credit unions who 
suspect financial elder abuse to report their suspicions to adult protective 
services or law enforcement.  It also requires bank tellers to undergo 
training to assist them in identifying elder abuse and navigating the 
reporting process.  The Financial Abuse Reporting Act can and should 
be used as a model.  It defines “suspected financial abuse” as when a 
bank employee observes behavior or transactions that would lead a 
person with similar training to form a reasonable belief that an elder is 
the victim of financial abuse, and it gives legal protection to those bank 
employees to report abuse.92  There are also enforcement mechanisms.  
Under the Financial Abuse Reporting Act, employees have to report 
suspected financial abuse by telephone immediately, or as soon as 
possible, and file a written report within two working days with the local 
adult protective services or law enforcement agency.  Failure to report 
an incident means that the bank is subject to a fine of up to $5,000. 
This scheme, broadened to include the rest the country and other 
financial professionals like brokers and insurance agents, would have an 
enormously positive impact on preventing and stopping elder financial 
abuse.  After all, the objective of the perpetrators of elder financial 
abuse is to take the financial assets of seniors.  As the repository of 
those financial assets, financial institutions can play a hugely beneficial 
role in safeguarding them and preventing them from falling into the 
wrong hands.  This would also benefit the financial institutions 
themselves as it would preserve these assets and keep them (and the fees 
they generate) with the financial institutions and out of the hands of 
fraudsters. 
 
 91. See BRIAN H. FANT, THE CIVIL LITIGATION RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION, 
available at http://www.brianfantlaw.com/articles/FINANCIAL-EXPLOITATION.pdf. 
 92. Id.  See also 2005 CAL. STAT. 94 (2005–2006), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1018_bill_20050829_chaptered.pdf. 
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2. Treating Financial Professionals as Their Senior Customers’ 
Fiduciaries 
As discussed above, apart from outright fraud and theft, one of the 
biggest financial issues facing seniors is the sale of unsuitable financial 
products to seniors.  While the discussion above focused on the sale of 
certain life insurance products like long-term deferred annuities, which 
generate high commissions but are generally inappropriate for seniors, 
there are doubtless numerous practices—like selling risky stocks to 
those on fixed incomes, churning securities frequently to generating 
commissions, or engaging in currency, derivatives, or options 
speculation on behalf of a senior who do does understand the activity or 
the risk—which are commonly engaged in, but are clearly inappropriate 
for the senior client. 
There are a couple of potential avenues that can be used to cut off this 
problem or at least minimize its harm.  One avenue would be to ban the 
sale of certain financial products to seniors.  This approach is 
problematic, however, because it is simultaneously too broad and too 
narrow.  It is too broad because it restricts seniors from financial 
products which may, in certain rare circumstances, be appropriate for 
them.  It also infantilizes competent seniors by taking away the ability to 
choose certain financial products.  If seniors on a fixed income want to 
take crazy risks by option-trading, they should be able to do so—so long 
as they are mentally competent and fully understand the risks.  It is also 
too narrow because there are countless amounts of financial products out 
there, and more that are created every day.  Banning one kind of 
financial product for sale to seniors would likely result in the creation of 
a slightly different product, with similar benefit to the broker or insurer.  
This would result in similar deleterious effects on seniors that the 
regulator or government has not had a chance to regulate yet.  It is 
nearly impossible for regulators to keep current with, much less ahead 
of, financial product innovation.  For both of these reasons, the ban of 
specific products for sale to seniors would be, at best, suboptimal. 
A better way to attack this problem is at its source.  A major reason 
these unscrupulous practices and those like them exist is a culture 
among financial institutions that does not respect customers.  For 
instance, a recent New York Times editorial revealed that Goldman 
Sachs employees commonly referred to their institutional clients as 
“muppets.”93  One way to change that culture is to change the law.  
Unlike directors and executives at public companies who owe a 
 
 93. Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-
sachs.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. 
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fiduciary duty to their shareholders and companies, insurance agents and 
brokers94 do not owe a fiduciary duty to their customers.95  This is true 
even though all the characteristics of the relationship between a 
customer and a broker or insurer—e.g., a relationship characterized by 
asymmetric knowledge and expertise where the customer is relying on 
the other party for advice—are typical of client relationships where a 
fiduciary duty or its equivalent exists.  Imposing a fiduciary relationship 
on brokers or insurers would make them duty-bound to look after the 
interests of their client.  Thus, brokers or insurers would be prohibited 
by their fiduciary duty from suggesting or pushing inappropriate 
financial products on seniors. 
This would be a much more flexible and effective solution than 
banning specific financial products.  It would not suffer from the 
problem of being overly broad described above because it would allow 
brokers/insurers to recommend whatever products work for a particular 
senior’s goals and risk tolerances.  Similarly, if a senior of sound mind 
wanted to take risks that his or her broker/insurer recommended against, 
he or she could do so.  A fiduciary duty would not restrict the senior in 
any way; it would simply insure that he or she were getting advice that 
looked after their own interests. 
A fiduciary duty would also avoid the narrowness problem described 
above because it would cover all financial products and practices.  In 
other words, a broker/insurer would be tasked with analyzing each 
product pitched to a senior and make sure that it made financial sense 
for that senior, or that the broker/insurer would handle his affairs 
similarly if in a comparable situation.  This is something that people 
likely assume brokers/insurers already do, but in fact they are not 
required to by law.  Establishing a fiduciary duty would fix that issue. 
Enforcing and policing compliance with this fiduciary duty is 
simple—customers could sue brokers or insurers if they believe they 
breached their fiduciary duty to them.  The law on fiduciary duty is 
long-standing and courts are familiar with analyzing the issue.  It should 
be relatively simple to apply these long-standing common law principles 
to a new profession—especially one which has the characteristics of 
 
 94. As required by Dodd–Frank, on Jan. 21, 2011 the SEC came out with the results of a study 
and recommended that brokers be required to have the same fiduciary duty to their clients as investment 
advisors.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER–DEALERS 
(Jan. 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.  This 
recommendation has not been followed. 
 95. Most people are misinformed about this.  See Alexis Leondis, ‘Clueless’ U.S. Investors 
Believe Brokers Have Fiduciary Duty, Survey Says, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/-clueless-u-s-investors-believe-brokers-have-fiduciary-
duty-survey-says.html (“Sixty percent of respondents said they thought insurance agents had to uphold a 
fiduciary duty, which isn’t true.”). 
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asymmetrical information and trust which usually accompany duties of 
this sort. 
A third, narrower approach, is to create a specific civil cause of action 
for senior financial abuse.  California is one state that has already gone 
down this path.  California’s Elder Abuse and Civil Protection Act 
provides a specific cause of action for financial exploitation of any 
resident sixty-five years or older or a person between the ages of 
eighteen and sixty-four with diminished capacity96 “when a person 
takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains or retains real or personal property 
of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to 
defraud or both.”97  California also imposes additional penalties in civil 
cases where “senior citizens” or disabled persons are damaged by 
“deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition.”98  
Specifically, plaintiffs can be awarded treble damages if “the defendant 
knew or should have known that his or her conduct was directed to one 
or more senior citizens or disabled persons.”99   
California’s approach, while helpful, is limited.  First, it would not 
apply to the sale of inappropriate financial products to seniors, which is 
an enormous problem.  Second, many of the conducts targeted by the 
California law are already common law torts (e.g., fraud, conversion, 
etc.), meaning that the California law applies increased scrutiny and 
penalties where the tort involves seniors, but does not make action that 
is currently permissible (e.g., selling inappropriate financial products to 
seniors) impermissible.  It also does nothing to change the culture at 
insurers and brokerage houses.  For all these reasons, the second 
approach, imposing a general fiduciary duty on brokers and insurers, 
would be the most efficacious. 
3. Requiring a License to Sell Products to Seniors 
This third solution is meant to solve the problem of ignorance.  As 
discussed above, knowledge of seniors and their potentially special 
needs is neither generally taught in school, nor is it part of a Series 
Seven exam, a bar exam, or any other general professional licensing 
requirement.  This is foolish because, as discussed above, there are 
numerous facts about seniors and tips about spotting senior financial 
abuse which are easy to understand and apply.  That is why there should 
be a licensing exam to sell financial products or give financial advice to 
seniors.  If a broker or insurance salesman wants to ply his or her trade 
 
 96. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30–.65. 
 97. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30. 
 98. FANT, supra note 91 (citing 2009 CAL. CIV. § 3345). 
 99. 2009 CAL. CIV. § 3345(b)(1) (2012). 
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among seniors, he or she should have to spend three to five hours 
learning about seniors, senior financial abuse, and signs of cognitive 
impairment, and pass a short test measuring what he or she learned.  A 
criminal background check would also be required.  After passing the 
test and the background check, a broker or insurance employee would be 
issued a license that he or she would be entitled to display.  
Additionally, brokers and insurance employees would be allowed to say 
that they are certified on their business cards and in advertisements. 
The requirement should not be particularly onerous, but even this 
minimal knowledge will assist brokers and insurance salesmen in 
understanding the needs of their senior customers and, perhaps as 
importantly, make them much more effective reporters and legitimate 
financial advisors.  Just as everyone looks for board-certified physicians, 
it would become an easily recognizable sign of legitimacy.  Faking a 
certification, of course, would be a crime. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Senior financial abuse is a problem that does, or will, affect all of us.  
We may be the victim, the victim could be a relative or a friend, or we 
could simply just feel the effect, through higher taxes or fees at financial 
institutions, of the billions of dollars lost to senior financial abuse every 
year.  Dodd–Frank recognizes that problem, but the solutions it offers, 
while useful, are too small to stop or even retard the growth of a 
problem of this magnitude.  We need to do more; we need to transform 
the relationship between financial service providers and their customers 
from wary antagonism to trusted, well-trained protectors and guardians.  
The three reforms suggested above should contribute significantly to 
bring that about—and they also enlist the medical profession, a set of 
trained eyes, to help see signs of trouble.  It does not matter from where 
these reforms emanate.  They could come from the federal governments, 
the states, or even perhaps the codes of conduct of professional 
organizations, but they should be enacted. 
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